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Abstract.  Robust assessment of the institutionalist account of comparative development is hampered by 
problems of omitted variable bias and reverse causation, since institutional quality is not randomly assigned 
with respect to geographic and human capital endowments.  A recent series of papers has applied spatial 
regression discontinuity designs to estimate the impact of institutions on incomes at international borders, 
drawing inference from the abrupt discontinuity in governance at borders, whereas other determinants of 
income vary smoothly across borders.  I extend this literature by assessing the importance of sub-national 
variation in institutional quality at provincial borders in China.  Employing nighttime lights emissions as a 
proxy for income, across multiple specifications I find no evidence in favour of an institutionalist account of the 
comparative development of China’s provinces.   
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I. Introduction  
Recent decades have seen the elaboration of an institutionalist paradigm in the study of comparative 
economic development.  This paradigm emphasizes that institutions, “the humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interaction” (North, 1990, p.3), structure the incentives shaping economic exchange.  From a 
growth perspective, good institutions are those which reduce transaction costs and secure property rights, which 
will encourage investments in human and physical capital and facilitate economic exchange.  Poor institutions 
are those which limit access to secure property rights to elite allies of the state.   In the absence of secure 
property rights, high transaction costs deter investments and impose costs on economic agents who must 
attempt secure these rights privately.  As such, the institutions of formal governance are modeled as the 
fundamental driver of long-run economic performance.   
Intuitively, differential growth rates in the wake of the separation of the two Koreas and the two Germanys 
suggest that the institutionalist account is plausible (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005).  Robust empirical 
assessment of this paradigm, however, has proven challenging given the dangers of confounding and reverse 
causation.  While cross-country analyses undertaken in the 1990s uncovered associations between numerous 
measures of institutional quality and economic performance (e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1995; Hall and Jones, 
1999), it may be that since quality institutions like property rights protection are costly to enforce, richer 
societies can afford better institutions, which would reverse the causality underlying the observed association.  
Clark (2007), for instance, suggests that rather than good institutions facilitating trade by protecting property 
and reducing uncertainty in exchange, increased opportunities for trade or demand for the products of a region 
can increase demand for trade-supporting institutions.  Rather than being a determinant of trade volumes, good 
institutions may therefore be a response to increased opportunities for trade owing to demand shocks, reductions 
in transportation costs owing to technological change, and the like.  These early findings may also have been 
subject to omitted variable bias, as additional factors like geography, human capital endowments or culture may 
drive both institutional quality and economic performance.1  Indeed, it is a stylized fact that richer countries, in 
 
1 For instance, Glaeser et al (2004) revisit standard cross-country investigations and find that while average constraints on government 
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addition to having more highly rated institutions, tend to have higher human capital levels than do poorer 
countries, and in many cases are more favourably situated in a climactic and geographic sense. 
More recently, economists have sought to leverage plausibly exogenous historical sources of variation in 
institutional quality in institutional quality to estimate the causal effect of institutions on economic growth in an 
instrumental variables framework (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001, 2002).  However, Glaeser et al 
(2004) question whether these papers have adequately satisfied the exclusion restriction on which the estimation 
approach relies, and moreover propose that a human capital-centric interpretation of these results is more 
plausible.  Indeed, as discussed below, literatures emphasizing human capital, geo-climactic, and ethnocultural 
determinants of development contend that the contend that institutionalist accounts are subject to confounding. 
This paper contributes to an emerging literature which employs spatial regression discontinuity designs 
(RDDs) to estimate the causal effect of institutional quality on economic development at borders.  RDDs enable 
robust inference of causal effects while relying on less restrictive assumptions than alternative approaches, and 
as such have been validated as a more robust method for establishing causal inference than other forms of 
natural experiments (Cook, Shadish and Wong, 2008).  Spatial RDDs are ideally suited to the study of the effect 
of government-backed institutions on income where the institutions under which people live vary 
discontinuously at a defined administrative boundary, whereas other determinants of income vary smoothly 
across these borders.  Recent applications of a spatial RDD approach to the study of institutions include 
Michalopolos and Papaioannou (2014) who use a spatial RDD to examine whether incomes vary 
discontinuously at national borders in Africa, finding no effect once ethnicity has been controlled for.  Dell 
(2010), however, finds evidence of a legacy from extractive institutions hundreds of years ago on current 
incomes in Peru.  In a cross-national study, Pinkovskiy (2017) finds abrupt differences in growth rates at 
international borders, implying the relevance of national institutions, or national-level cultural differences, to 
incomes in border regions where geographic and climactic conditions are otherwise comparable.   
 
across a period of years is associated with economic growth in the same period, the initial level of constraint is not predictive of 
subsequent growth.  Initial human capital levels, however, are predictive of future economic performance.  Moreover, while there is a 
robust association between assessments of institutional quality and growth, there is no association between constitutional constraints 
on government power and growth.  
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This methodology has not yet been extended to estimate the effect of subnational institutions on 
comparative development within countries.  In this paper I employ the spatial RDD approach to assess the 
relevance of institutions as an explanation for patterns in comparative development among Chinese provinces.  
China’s size, 31 provinces, relative cultural and ethnic homogeneity, regional income disparities and 
institutional diversity make it an ideal setting for the employment of a spatial RDD to test an institutionalist 
account of subnational comparative development.  I use World Bank (2008) assessments of province-level 
institutional quality to identify higher and lower quality institutions among 68 pairs of provinces, and test for 
discontinuities at provincial borders as one moves from a province with relatively lower quality institutions to 
one with relatively higher quality institutions.  If province-level institutional differences are an important driver 
of comparative development within China, discontinuities in income should be evident at provincial borders.2     
In the spirit of conventional RDDs, inference is drawn from regions in the immediate vicinity (50km at the 
greatest extent) of either side of a provincial border, where the identifying assumption of comparability in 
observed and unobserved covariates on either side of the border is most easily sustained.  In the results section 
below, I first demonstrate that a series potential confounds that may also affect income levels (precipitation, 
elevation, population and public goods provision) vary smoothly across borders, substantiating the assumption 
of comparability underlying the spatial RDD (Keele and Titiunik, 2016).   
Though China is ethnically relatively homogeneous, within Chinese territory there is considerable diversity 
in dialects within the Sino-Tibetan phylum, which may reflect cultural differences that are relevant for 
comparative development.  Figures 1a and 1b represent the traditional homelands of Chinese ethnic and 
linguistic groups, respectively.  Where provincial borders track these cultural borders, the spatial RDD will not 
enable us to attribute a discontinuity in income to a discontinuity in institutional quality, raising the spectre of 
multiple treatments and violating the assumption of RDDs.  To guard against the danger of noncomparability, in 
the main specification I therefore derive estimates from within-dialect group variation in institutional quality on 
 
2 I show below that while the World Bank assessments were conducted in provincial capitals, there is compelling evidence that the 
resulting rankings reflect province-level variation in institutional quality. 
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the basis of the Language Atlas of China (Lavely and Berman, 2012).3  In subsequent analyses, I present 
separate RDD estimates at each of 22 provincial borders representing a putatively large discontinuity in 
institutional quality.  Proxying for income using nighttime lights emissions, in the main analysis and across each 
of these individual borders, I find no discontinuity in incomes.  The finding is robust to three operationalizations 
of nighttime lights emissions and multiple RDD specifications.  These findings suggest that institutional 
diversity is not the primary driver of China’s subnational comparative development.   
Insert Figures 1.a) and 1.b) about here 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
In the next section, I discuss contending paradigms of comparative development emerging in the recent 
literature which highlight the need for a robust methodological approach to the study of the impact of 
institutions.  I also provide a brief assessment of China’s institutional diversity, and describe existing evidence 
on the explanatory power of institutional variation with respect to interprovincial income inequality.  Section III 
describes the data employed and the paper’s identification strategy.  Spatial RDD estimates of the effect of 
institutional quality on incomes at a series of provincial borders are presented in Section IV.  Section V 
concludes with a consideration of the implications of these findings for the study of comparative development 
in China and beyond. 
 
II. Literature review 
Contending accounts 
Among skeptics of the institutionalist account of comparative development are those who argue for the 
primacy of geographic, topographic and climatic factors.  The “geo-centric” account emphasizes, for instance 
that challenging topography, low proximity to global markets and inhospitable climates cannot be overcome 
with quality institutions.  Hence for instance, land-locked, mountainous Bolivia, despite having institutions 
 
3 The intuition behind this approach is represented in Figure 2, which shows the Gansu-Sichuan border.  Estimates of the impact of 
Sichuan’s higher-quality institutions are derived separately within the regions traditionally occupied by speakers of Mandarin-related 
dialects (in red) and regions traditionally home to speakers of Tibeto-Burman dialects (in green).   
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rated better than Vietnam’s, has had difficulty attracting foreign investment without the advantages of 
Vietnam’s extensive coastline, deep water ports and proximity to other Asian growth centres (Sachs, 2012).  
Sachs (2003, 2012), also notes that various measures of economic performance are correlated with climate zone 
and disease ecology across countries.  Even where an association between institutional quality and economic 
performance can be demonstrated, in the geocentric account, favourable geography generates trade 
opportunities, which increases the value of local endowments, which in turn increases demand for secure 
property rights.  The costs of securing property rights are then worth bearing, whether privately or publicly.  
The geo-centric account does not go so far as to say that institutional quality in the form, say, of property rights 
protection, has no role to play in comparative development.  If two locales are equal in their geographic 
endowments, these advantages will leveraged most effectively in the locale with more secure property rights.  
However, the magnitudes of these differences must be assessed where geography is a constant, and are, in this 
view, likely to be small relative to geographic drivers.   
Skepticism of the institutionalist account has also emerged in a series of papers investigating the historical, 
cultural, and possibly genetic “deep roots” of comparative development.  Consistent with a theory of the 
persistence of initial advantages in technology adoption, Comin, Easterly and Gong (2010) show that the level 
of technology adoption in the year 1500 AD is a strong predictor of technology adoption and per capita income 
today.  There is also robust evidence of technological persistence from as early as 1000 BC.  Putterman and 
Weil (2010) find that the share of a country’s population in the year 2000 which is descended from populations 
which in 1500 were living in locales that had longer histories of functioning states and earlier transitions to 
agriculture is predictive of contemporary incomes.  In a comprehensive summary of this literature, Spolaore and 
Wacziarg (2013) note that both cultural and biological transmission of traits favourable to economic 
development are possible, though whether these traits impact development directly, or indirectly as barriers to 
the diffusion of technology across populations, remains unclear (see also Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009).  In a 
paper linking the bio-cultural and geo-centric accounts, Galor and Ozak (2016) provide evidence that agro-
climatic conditions favourable to the early adoption of agriculture gave rise to selection and/or learning effects 
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that have been transmitted to modern populations.  Having ancestors exposed relatively early to agriculture 
predicts a long-term orientation in one’s time preference, which is favourable for economic development to the 
extent that it predicts a higher savings rate and a long-term orientation to investment decisions.  A related 
literature also shows that levels of trust and social capital within populations, irrespective of institutional 
quality, is predictive of the spatial distribution of economic development within countries (e.g., Tabellini, 
2010). 
 
Subnational institutional diversity in China 
Several stylized facts make China an interesting case for assessment of the institutionalist account of 
development via a spatial RDD.  Given China’s remarkable growth in recent decades and the absence of 
evidently inclusive nationwide institutions in the Northian sense, some scholars have viewed China’s growth as 
a puzzle for institutionalists (Xu, 2011; Lu, Png and Tao, 2013).  At the same time, other scholars have credited 
unique features of China’s decentralized approach to economic policymaking as being essential institutional 
foundations of China’s rapid growth (Montinola, Qian and Weingast, 1995; Weingast, 1995; Qian and 
Weingast, 1997).  One point of agreement among scholars is that while not nominally a federal state, economic 
policymaking in China is highly decentralized (Xu, 2011; Birney, 2014; Fuller, 2007).  According to one 
estimate, approximately 74% of all government spending in China is undertaken at the local (i.e., provincial and 
below) level (Wong, 2007).  Moreover, the lines of authority between central government ministries and 
provincial governments, and the degree of government control over public service units (e.g., schools and health 
facilities) are legal grey areas.  Local officials, then, have “immense discretion” (Birney, 2014, p.1) over 
governance, including fiscal policy, the provision of public services, the making and enforcement of laws, the 
allocation of firm finance, contract enforcement and the protection of property rights (Xu, 2011).  Given this 
discretion, a system has emerged in which the regulatory environment is “fractured” (Pearson, 2007), resulting 
in policy heterogeneity (Poncet and Barthelemy, 2008).  This decentralization has led to the rise of “locally 
distinctive models of regional development” at the provincial level (Wei, 2007, 19).  Hence scholars identify, 
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for instance, the “Jiangsu model” (Xianping, 2004), “Guangdong model” (Xu and Zhang, 2009), or “Zhejiang 
model” (Ye and Wei, 2005) of development, which are characterized in part by diverse approaches to property 
rights and ownership structures among firms.  Lin and Liu (2006) argue that China’s regional income disparities 
are “endogenously determined” by differing provincial development strategies, with interior provinces 
continuing to pursue misguided economic policies. 
  This province-level variation in institutions is reflected in several quantitative assessments.  To take two 
components of World Bank measures of the cost to firms of securing their property rights, the time required to 
resolve a sale of goods dispute ranges from 112 days in Nanjing (Jiangsu province) to 540 days in Changchun 
(Jilin province), while the cost as a percentage of the value of the claim varies from 9% in Shanghai to 41.8% in 
nearby Hefei (Anhui province).  In a 2004 World Bank survey that asked over 12,400 Chinese firms to assess 
the percentage of cases in which legal contracts or properties had been upheld, provincial average responses 
ranged from 41% in Gansu province to 83% in Zhejiang.  The World Bank (2008) has documented substantial 
variation in proxies for corruption across Chinese provinces.  There is a broad consensus across various 
assessments as to the provinces in which institutional quality is relatively high.  The correlation in provincial 
rankings between two leading indexes (the World Bank’s measure of property rights referenced above and 
employed further below, and the National Economic Research Institute’s marketization index), is 0.72.   
Per capita income also varies dramatically throughout China, incomes in the richest provinces being on par 
with those in Eastern Europe, while India is a better comparison for the poorest provinces.  Indeed, China’s 
substantial population of migrant workers is a testament to the existence of wage gaps across the country.  Since 
institutional quality also varies substantially across provinces, it is tempting to conclude that institutions are 
driving economic performance in China, and thus account for a substantial share of regional inequality.  Figure 
3 presents the association between World Bank provincial ranks in property rights security and per capita GDP 
in 2008.  The r2 in this simple regression indicates that 50% of the sample variance in GDP is accounted for by 
variation in the ranking of institutional quality. 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
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Institutionalist accounts in the Chinese case have found higher firm investment rates when property 
rights are perceived to be secure (Cull and Xu, 2005; Hallward-Driemeier, Wallsten and Xu, 2006).  Property 
rights security also appears to positively impact firm research and development spending (Lin, Lin and Song, 
2010) and productivity (Lu, Png and Tao, 2013).  The location choice of US multinationals within China is also 
correlated with property rights security (Du, Lu and Tao, 2008).   
Much of the institutionalist literature on China’s comparative development has presumed that 
institutional quality is exogenous to local geographic and human capital endowments.  Reporting on a World 
Bank survey of investment climate across 120 Chinese cities, for instance, Mako (2006) states that, “cities in the 
bottom quintile of ‘government effectiveness’ could expect near-term gains of 25-35 percentage points in firm 
productivity and 15-25 percentage points in foreign ownership” (Mako, 2006, 6) were governance improved to 
the level found in China’s best governed provinces.  Dollar et al (2004) similarly claim that an average Chinese 
city could see firm productivity increases of 45 percent by improving governance to the level in cities in the 90th 
percentile.   
 If institutional quality is endogenous, however, these estimates are unreliable.  It is notable, for instance, 
that provinces rated as having better institutions tend to be those along China’s coast, and which thereby enjoy 
several geographic advantages over their inland neighbours.  Bao et al (2002) note that as one moves inland, 
China’s topography becomes increasingly mountainous, implying high transportation costs and a resulting 
barrier to trade and technology diffusion.  This is true of precipitation levels, too, which is particularly 
important in China, where in the years under study about 37% of the population was engaged in agriculture 
(World Bank, 2017), and the legacy of agricultural productivity improvements in the early reform years has 
been important for subsequent industrial development.  Though the interior provinces are richer in mineral 
resources, these are costly to extract and transport owing to geography.  The wealthier coastal provinces are also 
more easily connected to world markets, and have deeper familial ties with the more economically and 
technologically advanced societies in Taiwan and Hong Kong.  According to a geocentric reading of the 
evidence, then, once the post-Mao reforms were enacted and China opened again to the outside world, the 
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inherent advantages of eastern provinces could be leveraged, and differential growth rates driven by geography 
followed.  
Research applying “deep roots” theories to China is limited.  Bai and Kung (2011) assess the relative 
genetic distance to Taiwan for all pairs of Chinese provinces, and find that since the reopening of China-Taiwan 
travel in 1987, relative (but not absolute) genetic distance from Taiwan has been predictive of higher per capita 
GDP.  On the assumption that visitors to the mainland from more-developed Taiwan were more likely to visit 
and trade with their relatives, this finding implies that traits favourable to development diffuse through 
communication and economic exchange, rather than directly through biological inheritance.  Bai and Kung 
(2015) report further evidence that biological and cultural differences within China have historically been 
barriers to technology diffusion, which questions the primacy of institutional quality as the most binding 
constraint on income convergence. 
 
III. Methodology 
Regression discontinuity designs 
China provides an ideal setting for the application of a spatial RDD to assess an institutionalist account 
of comparative subnational development.  China has 31 provinces4, among which there are 68 border pairs.  We 
are provided, then, with numerous quasi-experiments in institutional quality at provincial borders, as one moves 
from a province of relatively lower to relatively higher institutional quality.  Despite the conventional 
summation of centre-local relations implied by the proverb, “the mountain is high, and the emperor far away”, 
the penetration of local government into the lives of citizens in even remote areas has a long history in China.  
For instance, Chen and Lan (2017) document that during the agricultural collectivization drive of the mid-
1950s, government had managed to enforce collectivization upon 96% of the rural population.  This indicates 
the reach of provincial institutions of governance is not limited to capital cities.  China is also a relatively 
homogenous country in terms of culture and ethnicity, and while larger minority groups are concentrated in 
 
4 This count includes 22 provinces, five autonomous regions and four province-level municipalities.   
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some broad regions of the country, the rough boundaries of these groups do not precisely follow provincial 
borders.  As noted above, I nevertheless take the cautious approach of deriving main estimates from within-
dialect group variation in institutional quality.  Similarly, while China is geographically diverse, provincial 
borders do not track abrupt geographic or climactic discontinuities, nor discontinuities in infrastructure, as I am 
able to show below.  Historians are also of the broad view that the precise location of provincial borders is 
arbitrary with respect to geographic, cultural and economic territories, and that this has been true since at least 
the Ming Dynasty (Fitzgerald, 2002).   
In a straightforward RDD, observations are assigned to a treatment condition, d=1, based on the value of 
a running variable, c.  RDDs are appropriate where d is a discontinuous function of the value of c at some 
precisely defined cutoff, c*.  Thus for observations >=c*, d=1, whereas for observations <c*, d=0.  Robust 
inference of the effect of treatment on the outcome variable depends on the assumption that omitted variables 
vary continuously around c*, whereas treatment varies discontinuously.  Spatial RDD studies of institutions 
treat geographic location as the running variable, c, and an observation’s location on, in this case, the high 
quality institution side of a border as determinative of treatment.  Identification in a spatial RDD relies on the 
assumption that local determinants of economic performance vary continuously at the border, whereas 
governance varies discontinuously.  Thus while climate, topography, distance to population centres or export 
markets vary smoothly across the border, it is as if otherwise similar locations have been exposed in a quasi-
random fashion to different institutions.  If the assumption of smooth variation across the border in these 
covariates can be sustained, a spatial RDD provides a unique method for an unbiased assessment of the effect of 
good institutions on economic performance at borders.  Moreover, by limiting our analysis to territories within a 
narrow band along provincial borders, we can be confident that local conditions are not determinative of 
province-level institutions, and hence that provincial institutions are exogenous to local conditions.   
It should be emphasized that the local treatment effect estimated via a spatial RDD is based on all 
discontinuities at the border.  I am able to show below that a series of geographic and climactic variables vary 
smoothly across provincial borders, as do population levels.  Yet as administrative borders mark changes in 
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governing authorities, any discontinuities in income would reflect the sum effects of all government policy, 
including, for example, public goods provision.  I therefore establish comparability in terms of a proxy for 
public goods provision, road density, to further ensure that any observed discontinuities reflect the quality of 
governance rather than all government activity per se.   
 
Data and variables 
I proxy for income in border regions using nighttime lights emissions.  These emissions are recorded by 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (NOAA)’s Defense-Meteorological Satellite Program - 
Operational Linescan System (DSMP-OLS).  Though these satellites were initially launched to gather data on 
cloud cover to improve weather forecasting, they also record light emissions, and are sensitive enough to detect 
the luminosity of street lighting (Keola, Anderson and Hall, 2015).  The DSPM-OLS satellites orbit the earth 
daily, recording light emissions between 20:00 and 22:00 local time at a resolution of approximately 1km2 at the 
equator.  Each of these 1km2 pixels is coded with a digital number representing luminosity on a scale ranging 
from 0 to 63.  Worldwide pixel-level datasets are released annually by the NOAA which average the recorded 
luminosity values recorded on cloud-free nights during a calendar year.5 
Numerous studies have validated nighttime lights emissions as a proxy for income (e.g., Henderson et 
al., 2012; Min and Gaba, 2014; Klemens et al., 2015).  Henderson et al (2012) estimate the elasticity of 
luminosity growth over time and traditional income data in countries with robust statistical data, finding that the 
long run growth rate in luminosity is approximately equal to the long run rate of income growth as measured 
more traditionally.  Nighttime lights are a particularly useful proxy for income in a developing country context, 
where official government data are often unreliable (Jerven, 2013) and household survey data, when available, 
often fails to accord with official statistics (Ravallion, 2003).  These are important concerns in the Chinese 
 
5 I employ the NOAA’s stable-nighttime lights dataset.  To access the data, and for a description of other available datasets which 
have not been pre-processed to remove ephemeral lights as caused by forest fires, the aurora borealis, and the like, see 
http://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/dmsp.html.  For further descriptions of the data and download process, see Noor et al (2008), Chen and 
Nordhaus (2011), Henderson, Storeygard and Weil (2012), and Addison and Stewart (2015).  Sources for all variables are identified in 
Table 12. 
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context for two reasons.  Firstly, given the incentives of Chinese officials to overstate economic growth in their 
locales (Edin, 2003), the reliability of official Chinese economic data has been questioned (e.g., Chow, 2006; 
Balding, 2013; Koch-Weser, 2013).  Moreover, many Chinese, especially in rural areas, earn income in the 
informal sector and are paid untaxed wages in cash that go unrecorded by government.  It is also well 
documented that China has a large population of migrant workers who work and reside away from their official 
place of residence as recorded by the state.  Even government income statistics based on probability sampling of 
local populations sample only legally documented residents.  This is thought to introduce substantial error into 
per-capita income estimates, the direction of which varies across provinces, some being net importers of labour, 
and others net exporters (Li and Gibson, 2013).  Indeed, the only existing application of nighttime lights data in 
the Chinese case finds, contrary to government data, no broad reduction in rural poverty from 2005 to 2010 
(Almas, Johnsen and Kotsadam, 2014).  It is also worth noting that once state ownership of firms is taken into 
account, China's GDP statistics are driven substantially by government investment, rather than the consumption 
of citizens (Lardy, 2006).  Given concerns about unproductive investment and corruption, a robust, apolitical 
measure of the consumption of ordinary citizens is particularly desirable in the Chinese case.  Finally, the 
nighttime lights data can be processed to construct treatment and control regions of the desired bandwidth by 
the researcher, including areas adjacent to the border, thereby enabling robust inference via the spatial RDD.   
To assess the effect of institutions on luminosity, I identify 68 inter-provincial borders in China6.  I 
identify one of each pair of provinces as having more highly rated institutions.  For each pair of provinces, the 
treatment variable, high quality, takes the value of 1 for the province with the higher-rated institutional quality, 
and 0 for the province with the lower-rated institutional quality.  Institutional quality is proxied using the World 
Bank’s Doing Business in China (2008), which ranked Chinese provinces according to the ease of doing 
business in the province.  One component of this ranking is a broad assessment of the ease of contract 
enforcement.  I take this as a proxy for property rights, an essential feature of high quality institutions.7  As this 
 
6 Hainan, China’s only island province, is excluded from the analysis.  The Hong Kong and Macau special administrative regions 
(SARs) are also excluded.  Borders are defined using GADM databases of Global Administrative Areas.  See www.gadm.org.   
7 For a detailed description of the construction of this measure, see World Bank documentation at 
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measure of de facto property rights protection was assessed by the World Bank in 2008, I take mean luminosity 
across 2009 and 2010 as the dependent variable.  Using what amounts to a lagged measure of institutional 
quality helps to further guard against the possibility of reverse causation (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 
2014).   
While the World Bank report presents assessments of province-level institutional quality, their rankings 
are based on surveys conducted in provincial capital cities only. Though the variation in contract enforcement 
uncovered by these surveys is substantial, by itself their report does not enable us to conclude with confidence 
that these differences across provincial capitals are in fact reflective of province-wide differences.  That is, 
though the capital city of Guangdong (Guangzhou) may offer better contract enforcement than the capital of 
neighbouring Hunan (Changsha) the World Bank report does not document whether the purported Guangdong-
Hunan difference in institutional quality is meaningful at the border between the provinces.  This paper’s 
substantive conclusion rests on the assumption that these inter-provincial differences in institutional quality are 
indeed province-level differences which vary discontinuously at borders, and not unwarranted generalizations 
on the basis of varied provincial capitals that sit as islands in a sea of institutional sameness.  I begin the results 
section below with evidence in support of this assumption. 
To define the geographic scope of analysis around each border segment, I first use ArcGIS 10.4 to create 
“buffer zones” of 50 kilometres on either side of each border which are then divided into cells of 0.05 by 0.05 
decimal degrees.  The modal cell has an area of approximately 30 km2.   Our main dependent variable, 
luminosity, can be thought of as the natural logarithm of the total light emissions within a cell on a typical night 
in the years 2009 and 2010.8  In addition to this measure of the intensiveness of luminosity, I also assess the 
effect of treatment on an extensive measure by constructing a cell-level dummy variable, lit, which takes the 
value of 1 if any luminosity is present in the cell.  ArcGIS tags the centroid of each cell by its longitude and 
latitude coordinates, so that its precise location is known.  Limiting the analysis to, at the largest extent, a 50km 
 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/china/enforcing-contracts.  This measure is not available for Tibet, and so 
borders between Tibet and its neighbours are excluded from the analysis. 
8 Given nearly 58% bottom-coding, I add 0.01 to the raw value of the sum of emissions from pixels within a cell, and take the 
logarithm of this value.  See Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2014). 
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buffer on either side of the border helps to reduce the possibility of confounding, on the intuition that 
unobserved determinants of growth in each province are more similar as one moves toward the border.  Where 
observed covariates are concerned, this is documented empirically.   
This approach is illustrated in Figure 4a, using the border between Heilongjiang and Jilin provinces as 
an example.  The bright green line running roughly from the northwest to the southeast represents the border.  
The grid overlaying the image is a “fishnet” created in ArcGIS which defines the unit of analysis, the cell.  The 
extent of the fishnet indicates the 50km “buffer zone” around the border.  Cells to the north of the border are in 
Heilongjiang, and those to the south in Jilin.  The background colour indicates pixel-level luminosity, lighter 
shades reflecting higher light emissions.  Figure 4b is a higher resolution image at the same border. 
Insert Figure 4a about here 
Insert Figure 4b about here 
In an effort to ensure the comparability of cultural groups on either side of a border between high and 
low quality institution provinces, in the main specification I derive estimates of the impact of institutions on 
incomes from within dialect-group comparisons.  I use the Language Atlas of China (Lavely, 2000; Lavely and 
Berman, 2012) to assign each cell to a dialect group (see Figure 1.b).  Virtually all of mainland China is coded 
as within the Sino-Tibetan phylum.  Within the Sinitic stock, Lavely (2000) sorts dialects into groups, “within 
which languages are assumed to be mutually intelligible” (Lavely, 2000, p.2), whereas dialects across these 
groups are mutually unintelligible.  In Lavely’s coding, this results in the following groups: Mandarin group, Jin 
group, Gan group, Xiang group, Min group, Yue group, Hakka group, Hui group and a residual category 
composed of dialects spoken in only one or two counties.  The Language Atlas also identifies sub-groups which 
code dialects more narrowly, including those outside the Sinitic stock.  Given that Lavely’s (2000) original 
focus was on intra-Han dialect variation, I modify his coding by adding the following sub-groups to “group” 
status: Miao-Yao, Wu, and Yue (Cantonese).  I also code Mongolian and Tibeto-Burman dialects as distinct 
groups.  This coding results in 19 dialect groups.  After dropping groups which cover less than one percent of 
cells in border regions, I am left with the eight groups noted in Table 1.  Note that 67% of border cells are 
15 
 
within the Mandarin group. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Estimation 
Assignment of a cell to the treatment condition of relatively higher quality institutions in this context is a 
deterministic, discontinuous function of geographic location (latitude and longitude).  Robust inference in a 
spatial RDD requires isolating the discontinuous border effect of geographic location on the outcome from the 
smooth effect of location on the outcome.  There are two basic approaches to modeling this smooth effect.  One 
approach is to employ nonparametric techniques, such as local linear regressions.  This approach limits the 
analysis to observations within a specified bandwidth around the border.  The intuition behind local linear 
regression is that by focusing on observations near the border, we reduce the danger of bias as we do not need to 
make assumptions about the functional form of the effect of geography on the outcome variable.  The limitation 
of local linear regressions is that while bias is reduced in limiting the geographic scope of the analysis, this 
means drawing inference from fewer observations.  A second approach is to model the effect of geography 
directly in the context of a parametric regression including polynomials for geographic location.  Under this 
approach, it is important to model these effects appropriately, otherwise, for instance, a nonlinearity in the 
location-outcome relationship near the border could be mistaken for a discontinuous treatment effect.   This 
could introduce bias into estimated treatment effects.  The trade-off between the parametric and nonparametric 
approaches, then, is between bias and variability.   
The RDD literature recommends nonparametric techniques to avoid the possibility of bias in modeling 
choices, provided there are sufficient observations near the cutoff to minimize variance (Imbens and Lemieux, 
2008; Dell, 2010).  Moreover, Keele and Titiunik (2015) emphasize that spatial correlation can be dealt with 
effectively using nonparametric estimation.  Since the nighttime lights data are available at very high 
resolutions, we have a large dataset at most borders.  I therefore focus on nonparametric local linear regressions 
as my primary specification, as recommended by Athey and Imbens (2017).    
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Estimating local linear regressions requires selection of a bandwidth (i.e., the extent of a buffer zone) 
around the discontinuity, and a bin width within which average values will be calculated.  Rather than rely on 
an ad hoc approach to bandwidth and bin selection, I employ the data-driven approach described in Calonico, 
Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) and Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell and Titiunik (2017), which uses the underlying 
structure of the data to select an optimal bandwidth and bin width for estimation, and which allows the inclusion 
of covariates9.  In our primary specification with dialect group fixed effects, the basic functional form estimated 
at each border can be written as: 
 
0 ( )ijp p ijp j ijpy IQ f D   = + + + +                                                                           (1) 
where is the outcome variable in cell i in language group j, province p.  A cell’s location on the high-quality 
institution side of the border is denoted where IQ=1.  On the low quality side, IQ=0.  j  represents a series of 
dialect group dummies.    is the coefficient of interest, the estimated ceteris paribus effect of high quality 
institutions on luminosity.  Depending on the specification, ( )ijpf D enters as either linear and quadratic RDD 
polynomials, which control for the smooth effects of geography on the outcome, and which allow these effects 
to vary on either side of the border.  These are a polynomials of one-dimensional distance to the border, with a 
discontinuity at zero.  Where the identifying assumption of no discontinuities in observed covariates at the 
cutoff is sustainable, opinion in the RDD literature on the desirability of the inclusion of covariates is divided 
(see the discussion in Calonico et al., 2018).  Given the absence of discontinuities in control variables at borders 
as per the estimates shown below, and given the large number of cells at each border, the main specification 
does not include covariates.  However, in the interest of transparency, in a secondary specification I also include 
a series of cell-level covariates that may also affect the outcome variable, ijpX .  These include mean elevation 
 
9 Implemented using the Stata command “rdrobust”.  The accompanying package, “rdwselect”, selects bandwidth that minimizes 
mean squared error.  Standard error estimates in all specifications are reported using the cluster robust variance estimators.  See 
Calonico et al (2017) for more details.  To download this package and accompanying documentation, visit 
https://sites.google.com/site/rdpackages/rdrobust.   
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within the cell, the sum of annual precipitation within the cell, the logarithm of population within the cell 
according to the 2005 population census, the distance to the nearest road in kilometres, and the logarithm of the 
cell’s area.  Cells with no population are omitted from the analysis.  Controlling for population density also 
ensures that the effect of institutions beyond the effect on population density is assessed (Michalopoulous and 
Papaioannou, 2014)10.  Controlling for distance to the nearest road helps guard against the multiple treatments 
concern, in that the measured effect of institutions will be net of the effect of public goods provision.   
 In addition to this main specification with dialect group fixed effects, I also undertake spatial RDDs at a 
series of individual borders.  Differences in ranking between bordering provinces of course vary, from a low of 
one ranking spot (between Shaanxi and Chongqing) to a high of 26 (between Guangdong and Hunan).   The 
mean difference in rank among 68 border pairs is 8.79, with a standard deviation of 6.51.  Whatever 
discontinuity exists between the former pair of provinces in institutional quality, the institutionalist argument is 
more fairly assessed where the gap in institutional quality is thought to be large.  I therefore estimate separate 
regressions using a modified version of the above model without dialect group fixed effects for each border 
segment where the gap in World Bank ratings is at least one sample standard deviation (and thus, is seven 
ranking spots or larger).  This leaves 22 border pairs. 11  This exercise can be interpreted as a robustness check 
on our main, within-dialect groups fixed effect analysis, insofar as it substantiates the consistency of our main 
finding across a large number of particular borders. 
 
IV. Results 
Governance discontinuities at provincial borders 
 
10 An alternative approach to controlling for population would be to deflate our dependent variable by population.  As noted by 
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2017), however, non-linearities in the elasticity between population and luminosity could lead to 
unpredictable biases.  Population therefore enters the regression on the right hand side in this case. 
11 As noted below, given the large number of border pairs, to be conservative about the avoidance of bias owing to non-comparability, 
I omit from the analysis one border pair at which there is some evidence of a discontinuity in road density in a narrow band around the 
border.  As data for numerous covariates are available, following Keele and Titiunik’s (2016) terminology, I take the conservative 
position that treatment and control cells at each border are “comparable”, and can thus be modeled through the inclusion of controls in 
regressions, rather than assume treatment and control regions are perfect counterfactuals for each other (i.e., differences in covariates 
are “ignorable”). 
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I first present evidence that the World Bank’s rankings of governance quality are reflective of province-wide 
differences in governance, and thus that institutional quality differs at provincial borders, and not merely across 
provincial capitals.  I present two lines of evidence from different data sources.  In the first I employ data from 
two World Bank surveys of Chinese firms, undertaken in 2004 and 2006.  In each survey, 100 firms were 
sampled in each of the same 120 cities.  Each survey included a module on the firm’s experience interacting 
with government and the legal system.  Five questions in particular are germane to firms’ perceptions of 
institutional quality.  These are as follows: 
1. "Amongst the commercial or other disputes that your company was involved with, what has been the 
likelihood (in terms of percentage) that your company's contractual and property rights (including 
enforcement) are protected?"  World Bank (2006) presents city-level aggregates, standardized in order 
to construct an index.   
2. Travel and entertainment costs, relative to sales (World Bank, 2006).  City-level aggregates computed 
by World Bank. 
3. “How many days does the GM or vice GM spend on government assignments and communications per 
month? (Government agencies include Tax Administration, Customs, Labor Bureau, Registration 
Bureau, etc.; assignments refer to handling the relationship with government workers, consolidating and 
submitting various reports or statements, etc.)” (World Bank, 2004).  Firms were presented with the 
following ordinal response categories: (1)1 day (2)2-3 days (3)4-5 days (4)6-8 days (5)9-12 days (6)13-
16 days (7)17-20 days (8) > 21 days.  I compute city-level mean responses. 
4. “In the case of commercial disputes with suppliers, clients or subsidiaries in your province, how much 
confidence do you have that the disputes will be settled with justice by the local legal system” (World 
Bank, 2004).  Firms responded in percentage terms.  I compute city-level mean responses. 
5. “In commercial or other legal disputes, what percent of cases were your company’s legal contracts or 
properties protected” (World Bank, 2004).  Firms responded in percentage terms.  I compute city-level 
mean responses. 
I assemble a city-level dataset consisting of these variables, the province in which the city is located, and the 
city’s geographic coordinates.  I then populate a list of dyads consisting of city pairs, and calculate the absolute 
difference in city average responses to each of these five institutional variables.  The dataset is then limited so 
that for each city, its pair is the closest city in either its own province or in a province with which it shares a 
border.  A limiting distance of 150km between city pairs is imposed.  The resulting dataset consists of 150 pairs 
of neighbouring cities which are distinguished as being “within-province” neighbours or “across-province” 
neighbours.  If the assumption that variation in institutional quality across China is indeed province-level is 
sustainable, we would expect smaller differences in perceived institutional quality among neighbouring firms 
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within the same province than among neighbouring firms separated by provincial borders.  Figure 5 compares 
mean differences among pairs of across-province neighbours with those among within-province neighbours.  
For each of our five measures of institutional quality, larger differences are found across provinces than within 
provinces.  Recall that we have imposed an upper limit of 150km on how distant a city can be from its pair.  
Among these neighbouring cities, separation by a provincial border has a predictable effect of increasing 
difference in mean responses to these five survey questions.  Though the effects are not dramatic in magnitude, 
the consistency of this effect argues in favour of province-level variation in institutional quality. 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
Our second line of evidence comes from prefecture-level data on the share of workers employed by private 
enterprises.  Private enterprises remain a politically sensitive business form in China to the extent that they 
threaten the rents enjoyed by state-owned enterprises and, though they generate tax revenues, are not effective 
instruments of state policy.  Household enterprises were recognized as a legitimate commercial form only in 
1981, and private enterprises in 1988 (Young, 1989).  Private enterprises have been frequent targets of 
expropriation by government (Chen et al, 2011; Huang, 2008), and local governments have had, “considerable 
discretion in establishing the nature and size of fees to be paid by enterprises under their jurisdictions” (Choi, 
2009, p.80).  The credit constraints faced by private enterprises are also well-documented (e.g., Poncet et al., 
2010).  The size of the private sector relative to the state sector is therefore a useful indicator of local 
institutional quality, in that institutional quality has been a constraint on the growth of this sector.   
In Chinese governance, prefectures are one administrative level below provinces, and a broader range of 
prefectural-level economic data is published at this level than at smaller, subordinate levels (i.e., the county 
level).  In an effort to determine whether discontinuities in this measure of institutional quality exist at 
provincial borders, I construct a series of comparisons based on prefectures adjacent to each provincial border.  
Figure 6 represents the site of one such comparison, at the Guangdong-Hunan border.  Among Hunan’s 14 
prefectures, Yongzhou and Chenzhou are closest to the border with Guangdong.  Among Guangdong’s 21 
prefectures, Qingyuan and Shaoguan are closest to the border with Hunan.  These prefectures are highlighted in 
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the figure.  The location of provincial capitals, Changsha and Guangzhou, are indicated.  The intuition behind 
limiting the comparison of private sector employment to prefectures along the border is the same as that 
underlying spatial regression discontinuity designs generally, insofar as province-level variation is best isolated 
at locations as near as possible to a provincial border.  By this logic, data on private sector employment at 
smaller administrative levels would be preferable, but prefectural data is the best available. 
Insert Figure 6 about here 
To operationalize private sector employment at the prefectural level, I divide the category, “Number of 
employed persons in urban private enterprises and self-employed individuals” by the category “employees”, the 
latter referring to all employees within the prefecture.  I call the resulting variable percent private.  At each 
border, I then compute the average of this variable across prefectures on either side of the border12.  Finally, a 
dataset consisting of dyads of border regions is created, and for each pair of regions, the difference in percent 
private is calculated.  I also calculate the difference in rankings of institutional quality ascribed to each province 
in the pair by the World Bank.  The difference in percent private is calculated such that its value in the 
purportedly low-institutional quality province is subtracted from that of the high quality province.  Similarly, 
note that institutional quality rankings are reverse-ordered, such that the highest-rated province, Guangdong, is 
ranked as 30, and the lowest ranked province, Gansu, is ranked as 1.  Figure 7 is a scatter plot of the association 
between differences in percent private and differences in rank.  In these smaller administrative areas adjacent to 
provincial borders, increasing province-level differences in institutional quality are associated with increasing 
differences in one measure of institutional quality, the percent of the labour force employed in private 
enterprises.  The association is significant at the .05 level.   
Insert Figure 7 about here 
 
Though neither of these tests of the assumption that variation in institutional quality is in fact discontinuous at 
 
12 Data on private sector employment is not collected among autonomous prefectures.  These are prefectures where, generally 
speaking, a majority of the population is comprised of ethnic minority (i.e., non-Han Chinese) residents.  At borders where 
autonomous prefectures are among the adjacent prefectures, these are omitted from the construction of the variable.  At borders where 
all adjacent prefectures in one or both provinces are autonomous prefectures, this border pair of provinces is omitted from the analysis.   
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provincial borders is by itself conclusive, I view the consistency of this evidence, obtained from a multiple 
sources using varied definitions of institutional quality, as strongly supportive of this assumption.   
 
Main results: Comparability across observables 
I begin by demonstrating both graphically and via RDD estimation the validity of the assumption of 
comparability of border regions with respect to ethnicity, precipitation, elevation and road density.  In terms of 
geography and climate, Figure 8 shows that provincial borders do not track differences in elevation, which 
increases as one moves westward, while Figure 9 shows that July precipitation levels vary smoothly across 
provincial borders, also increasing as one moves west. 
Insert Figure 8 about here 
Insert Figure 9 about here 
Tables 2 through 5 demonstrate comparability using local linear regressions with a linear polynomial in 
which covariates (elevation, precipitation, distance to roads and population ) are treated as outcome variables.  
In the linear specification, there are no significant discontinuities in controls at borders at p = 0.05.  In the 
quadratic specifications (available in the online appendix), precipitation at the Anhui-Henan border and the 
Xinjiang-Gansu border differ, as does road density at the Hubei-Hunan border.  Though these covariates are 
included most specifications, results at these borders should be interpreted with greater caution.   
Insert Tables 2 through 5 about here 
Main results: Institutional quality and income 
Main estimates derived from local linear regressions with dialect group fixed effects are reported in 
Table 6.  Columns (1) and (2) take luminosity as the outcome variable, and employ linear and quadratic 
polynomials, respectively.  In columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is luminosity divided by cell 
population, again employing linear and quadratic polynomials, respectively.  In columns (5) and (6), the 
dependent variable is the dummy Lit, which takes the value of 1 when any luminosity is recorded in the cell.  
Linear and quadratic polynomials are employed in the models for columns (5) and (6), respectively.  In no 
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specifications is there a significant effect of institutional quality on income.  Indeed, the point estimates are of 
the opposite sign predicted by an institution-centric account.  Regression discontinuity plots of columns (1) and 
(2) are presented in the upper panels of Figure 10.  Cubic and quatric polynomial fits are presented in the lower 
panels.  No discontinuity at the cutoff (border) is evident.13   
Insert Table 6 about here 
Insert Figure 10 about here 
Table 7 repeats the analysis of Table 6 with control variables included.  Given the above-demonstrated 
comparability of observed covariates across borders, these results should be interpreted as a robustness check on 
the main results from Table 6.  For the quadratic polynomial models for luminosity and luminosity per person, I 
estimate a marginally statistically significant (p=.09 and p=.06, respectively) negative effect of institutional 
quality on income.   
Insert Table 7 about here 
 RDD estimates at 22 borders where a putatively large discontinuity in institutional quality exists are 
presented in Tables 8 and 9, taking luminosity as the dependent variable and employing linear and quadratic 
polynomials, respectively.  All models include covariates.  At only 1 of the 22 borders in Table 8 is there a 
statistically significant (p = 0.05) discontinuity in luminosity, and this in the opposite direction as predicted by 
the institutionalist account.  In the model employing the quadratic term in Table 9, no significant differences in 
luminosity are observed.  In Tables 10 and 11, the linear and quadratic models are used in a linear probability 
framework to estimate the effect of institutions on lit, a dummy taking the value of 1 when any luminosity is 
recorded in a cell.  All models include covariates.  In no cases is there a discontinuity in the probability of 
illumination.  This is also evident from the regression discontinuity plots in Figures 11 through 13 which again 
fit models of varied polynomials to identify any effects of institutional quality on luminosity at borders.   
 
Insert Tables 8 and 9 about here 
 
13 RDD plots generated using Stata’s “rdplot” command.  See note 9 above for details. 
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Insert Tables 10 and 11 about here 
Insert Figures 11 through 13 about here 
 
V. Discussion 
This paper extends the spatial regression discontinuity design approach to the study of subnational 
institutions in China.  Four broad conclusions emerge: (i) institutions of governance are indeed province level in 
that there is evidence of their discontinuity at provincial borders; (ii) spatial RDDs find no discontinuities at 
provincial borders for a range of observed covariates, suggesting the validity of the identifying assumptions of 
the RDD; (iii) estimates of the within-dialect group impact of high quality institutions on income, as proxied by 
three operationalizations of nighttime lights emissions, find no positive effects distinguishable from zero; (iv) 
these results are reproduced at 22 individual borders at which gaps in institutional quality as assessed by the 
World Bank are putatively large.  The unrestrictive identification assumptions of regression discontinuity 
designs, the data driven approach to bandwidth selection employed here, and the consistency of this finding 
across multiple specifications, argue for the robustness of these results.   
Though the measure of institutional quality employed here is a de facto assessment of the ease of enforcing 
contracts, it should be emphasized that it is a measure of the ability or willingness of government to establish 
secure rights of control and transfer over property.  This is in keeping with the dominant view of the 
institutionalist literature that the key precondition of effective property rights is the rise of a state that is strong 
enough in its monopoly on force and law to secure these rights, while at the same time being credibly 
constrained from expropriating private property or limiting access to secure property rights to elite allies.  Our 
results need not imply that contracting is unimportant, nor that private enforcement of contracts is impossible, 
and a sizable literature has demonstrated the relevance of trust and social capital for economic growth (e.g., 
Algan and Cahuc, 2010).  In the Chinese context, the role of guanxi, a web of (often kinship) relationships 
based on mutual moral obligations extending through time, in securing property against government predation 
has been documented (Zhang and Zhao, 2014).  The ability to invest in these informal structures to better secure 
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property rights implies that in the absence of high quality government-backed institutions, economic agents can 
nevertheless reduce transaction costs to a degree.  If these informal structures have been an important basis for 
contracting in reform-era China, this speaks to the importance of trust networks and familial relationships, 
rather than government-backed institutions, and trust networks that are not limited by provincial boundaries.  
Thus, even if trust networks substitute for formal structures in supporting economic exchange in China, this 
argues against the importance of institutions as commonly understood by economists.   
The paper contributes to a growing literature which has found either an absence of support for institution-
centric accounts of comparative development (e.g., Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2014), or support for 
counter-narratives emphasizing the importance human capital, geography and culture (e.g., Galor and Ozak, 
2016; Putterman and Weil, 2010; Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009, 2013).  This suggests, in the Chinese context 
and beyond, that the geographic, cultural and human capital roots of comparative development bear continued 
study. 
These results do not imply that no change in the quality of institutions, of whatever magnitude, can have a 
substantial effect on incomes.  The coincidence of the timing of China’s rise with the elimination of Maoist era 
agriculture policies, restrictions on labour mobility and commercial activity generally, is unlikely to be 
coincidental.  However, these results suggest that China’s regional inequality is not the result of different 
development models pursued by China’s provinces.   
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Figure 1.a) Traditional ethnic homelands, China 
 
 
Source: Geo-referencing of Ethnic Groups.  See Weidman, Rod and Cederman (2010). 
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Figure 1.b) Traditional homelands of linguistic groups, China 
 
Source: Lavely and Berman (2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
Figure 2. Within dialect group variation in institutional quality (Sichuan-Gansu border) 
 
 
Notes: Bold line represents border between Gansu (north of border) and Sichuan (south of border).  “Fishnet” indicates extent of 
buffer zone used to construct observations along border.  Red indicates traditional homeland of speakers of dialects within the 
Mandarin supergroup, and greed the traditional homeland of speakers of Tibeto-Burman languages.  See Lavely and Berman’s (2012) 
Language Atlas in China.   
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Figure 3.  Scatter plot, contract enforcement rank and per capita GDP across Chinese provinces 
 
Notes: Contract enforcement rank is via World Bank.  Per capita GDP data is from China’s National Bureau of Statistics. 
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Figure 4a.  Luminosity within cells in buffer zones surrounding border 
 
Notes: Bright green line indicates location of border between Heilongjiang and Jilin provinces.  Blue grid is a “fishnet” created in 
ArcGIS which defines the unit of analysis, the cell.  Extent of grid indicates 50km “buffer zone” around the border.  Cells to the north 
of the border are in Heilongjiang, and those to the south in Jilin.  Background colour indicates pixel-level luminosity, lighter shades 
reflecting higher light emissions. 
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Figure 4b.  Luminosity within cells in buffer zones surrounding border (high zoom) 
 
Notes: As in Figure 2a, scale 1: 125,000. 
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Figure 5. Within and across province differences in mean survey responses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 .05 .1 .15 .2
Abs. diff., percent cases property rights upheld
Within province
Across province
0 .002 .004 .006
Abs. diff., entertainment costs
Within province
Across province
0 .1 .2 .3
Abs. diff., days spent with govt, ordinal
Within province
Across province
0 2 4 6 8 10
Abs. diff., percent confidence legal system
Within province
Across province
0 5 10 15 20
Abs. diff., percent contracts upheld
Within province
Across province
39 
 
Figure 6. Setting for prefecture-level comparison of private enterprise employment 
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Figure 7. Scatter plot of difference in percent private sector employment and difference in institutional rank, 
bordering prefectures  
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Figure 8.  Elevation across Chinese provincial borders. 
 
 
Notes: Data are from Harvard’s China Historical Geographic Information System.  Data available via 
https://www.fas.harvard.edu/~chgis/data/chgis/v5/.  Darker shades indicate higher elevation.  Processed using ArcGIS. 
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Figure 9.  July precipitation across Chinese provincial borders 
 
Notes: Data are from WorldClim – Global Climate Data.  See http://www.worldclim.org.  Darker shades indicate higher July 
precipitation levels.  Processed using ArcGIS. 
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Figure 10. Regression discontinuity plots, dialect group fixed effect estimates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
Figure 11. Regression discontinuity plots, Gansu-Ningxia border. 
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Figure 12. Regression discontinuity plots, Anhui-Jiangsu border. 
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Figure 13. Regression discontinuity plots, Guangxi-Guangdong border. 
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Table 1. Frequency distribution of dialect groups, bordering cells 
Group Freq. Percent Cum. Pct. 
    
Gan  3,578 3.32 3.32 
Hakka 4,143 3.84 7.16 
Jin 10,201 9.46 16.63 
Mandarin 72,353 67.13 83.76 
Mongolian 6,141 5.70 89.46 
Tibeto-Burman 7,562 7.02 96.47 
Wu 2,544 2.36 98.83 
Yue (Cantonese) 1,259 1.17 100.00 
    
N 107,781   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 2. Control RDD regressions: Elevation, linear polynomial 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Elevation Anhui-Henan Anhui-Hubei Anhui-Jiangsu Anhui-Jiangxi Anhui-Shandong 
High quality -9.12 14.903 -1.514 18.418 -1.984 
 (23.236) (119.800) (4.540) (89.869) (1.626) 
Bandwidth 33.197 22.565 39.114 19.063 31.808 
Effective 
observations 
1207 287 1570 365 43 
Observations 2,519 969 2,977 1,174 163 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Elevation  Anhui-Zhejiang Hubei-Chongqing Hunan-Chongqing Inner Mongolia-
Gansu 
Ningxia-Gansu 
High quality -22.217 21.364 -144.000 -18.885 -13.084 
 (62.582) (100.000) (98.793) (32.194) (38.921) 
Bandwidth 28.736 21.957 22.666 21.494 23.645 
Effective 
observations 
454 659 119 1907 1026 
Observations 1,233 2,180 459 6,287 2,910 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Elevation Sichuan-Gansu Xinjiang-Gansu Fujian-Guangdong Guangxi-
Guangdong 
Hunan-Guangdong 
High quality -123.83 -76.074 -19.328 15.923 -64.156 
 (157.830) (97.363) (77.538) (59.374) (118.320) 
Bandwidth 20.954 21.886 21.091 18.914 17.656 
Effective 
observations 
772 715 254 522 321 
Observations 2,754 2,698 965 2,036 1,234 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Elevation Jiangxi-Guangdong Hubei-Hunan Jiangxi-Hunan Liaoning-Jilin Inner Mongolia-
Liaoning 
High quality -53.313 -45.295 -6.1493 11.771 -6.823 
 (55.879) (76.076) (93.705) (28.050) (33.392) 
Bandwidth 18.190 27.122 22.905 33.883 26.672 
Effective 
observations 
417 995 663 919 1036 
Observations 1,543 2,801 2,002 2,095 2,922 
 (1) (2) 
DV: Elevation Hubei-Shaanxi Shaanxi-Shanxi 
High quality 59.221 -18.175 
 (123.02) (42.421) 
Bandwidth 16.544 21.318 
Effective 
observations 
403 695 
Observations 1,519 2,694 
Notes: Estimates derived from local linear regressions.  Calculated via Stata’s “rdrobust”, fitting a linear polynomial model on either 
side of cutoff.  Observations refers to number of cells in buffer on either side of border, and effective observations those used in 
regression, reflecting mean squared error-optimal bandwidth (in kilometres), also noted in the table.  rdrobust calculates these bias-
corrected bandwidths using companion command, “rdbwselect”.  Both parameter of interest and bandwidth are bias corrected, 
variance being estimated using three nearest neighbours.  Locally-weighted averages computed using triangular kernel.  Standard 
errors in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 3. Control RDD regressions: Precipitation, linear polynomial 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Elevation Anhui-Henan Anhui-Hubei Anhui-Jiangsu Anhui-Jiangxi Anhui-Shandong 
High quality -11,032** 4,341 652.18 9,035.7 -3,124.4 
 (5027.6) (9591.4) (3,177) (10,191) (7,981.5) 
Bandwidth 11.404 14.219 11.703 12.199 19.755 
Effective 
observations 
464 218 688 286 33 
Observations 2,542 981 3,002 1,187 168 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Elevation  Anhui-Zhejiang Hubei-Chongqing Hunan-Chongqing Inner Mongolia-
Gansu 
Ningxia-Gansu 
High quality -9,618.5 -7,037.4 4,825.9 96.054 1,341.6 
 (8,793.7) (7,086.8) (12,679) (173.33) (865.04) 
Bandwidth 14.473 12.252 16.140 10.809 11.182 
Effective 
observations 
271 440 89 1114 634 
Observations 1,244 2,203 467 6,340 2,936 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Elevation Sichuan-Gansu Xinjiang-Gansu Fujian-Guangdong Guangxi-
Guangdong 
Hunan-Guangdong 
High quality 2,279.1 328.94* -11,987 2,698.6 3,136 
 (3,016.4) (170.92) (10,763) (7,772.9) (6,681.4) 
Bandwidth 11.368 13.332 13.772 11.720 12.826 
Effective 
observations 
539 450 190 401 302 
Observations 2,772 2,707 977 2,062 1,247 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Elevation Jiangxi-Guangdong Hubei-Hunan Jiangxi-Hunan Liaoning-Jilin Inner Mongolia-
Liaoning 
High quality 4,847.1 -983.79 -5,067.3 1,521.5 -985.25 
 (8,516.1) (5,366.8) (7,680.4) (1,490.7) (812.01) 
Bandwidth 12.818 12.553 11.798 11.668 10.008 
Effective 
observations 
356 618 411 438 556 
Observations 1,552 2,825 2,025 2,107 2,948 
 (1) (2) 
DV: Elevation Hubei-Shaanxi Shaanxi-Shanxi 
High quality 1,224.9 -292.04 
 (4,123.3) (714.51) 
Bandwidth 12.375 9.643 
Effective 
observations 
368 462 
Observations 1,532 2,722 
Notes: Estimates derived from local linear regressions.  Calculated via Stata’s “rdrobust” command that fits a linear polynomial model 
on either side of cutoff.  Observations refers to number of cells in buffer on either side of border, and effective observations those used 
in regression, reflecting mean squared error-optimal bandwidth (in kilometres), also noted in the table.  rdrobust calculates these bias-
corrected bandwidths using companion command, “rdbwselect”.  Both parameter of interest and bandwidth are bias corrected, 
variance being estimated using three nearest neighbours.  Locally-weighted averages computed using triangular kernel.  Standard 
errors in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 4. Control RDD regressions: Road density, linear polynomial 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Dist_road Anhui-Henan Anhui-Hubei Anhui-Jiangsu Anhui-Jiangxi Anhui-Shandong 
High quality -0.103 -0.461 -0.671 0.216 -1.201 
 (0.609) (1.331) (0.749) (1.586) (2.581) 
Bandwidth 21.879 22.838 22.761 19.616 25.718 
Effective observations 755 289 978 376 34 
Observations 2,542 981 3,002 1,187 168 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Dist_road  Anhui-Zhejiang Hubei-Chongqing Hunan-Chongqing Inner Mongolia-
Gansu 
Ningxia-Gansu 
High quality -0.272 -0.403 -2.289 -0.519 0.910 
 (0.827) (1.800) (2.618) (1.362) (0.967) 
Bandwidth 21.182 21.922 18.233 26.919 22.064 
Effective observations 340 674 85 2122 998 
Observations 1,244 2,203 467 6,340 2,936 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Dist_road Sichuan-Gansu Xinjiang-Gansu Fujian-Guangdong Guangxi-Guangdong Hunan-Guangdong 
High quality -0.121 4.318 1.036 1.126 -0.722 
 (1.205) (5.054) (1.374) (0.963) (1.221) 
Bandwidth 25.466 21.446 19.218 15.953 23.031 
Effective observations 896 725 221 425 423 
Observations 2,772 2,707 977 2,062 1,247 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Dist_road Jiangxi-Guangdong Hubei-Hunan Jiangxi-Hunan Liaoning-Jilin Inner Mongolia-
Liaoning 
High quality 0.400 4.084* -0.313 -0.088 0.233 
 (0.732) (2.130) (0.702) (0.573) (0.417) 
Bandwidth 31.121 14.910 26.539 22.537 28.362 
Effective observations 622 533 662 690 1093 
Observations 1,552 2,825 2,025 2,107 2,948 
 (1) (2) 
DV: Dist_road Hubei-Shaanxi Shaanxi-Shanxi 
High quality -1.631 0.399 
 (2.292) (1.325) 
Bandwidth 17.675 27.680 
Effective observations 402 931 
Observations 1,532 2,722 
Notes: Estimates derived from local linear regressions.  Calculated via Stata’s “rdrobust” command that fits a linear polynomial model 
on either side of cutoff.  Observations refers to number of cells in buffer on either side of border, and effective observations those used 
in regression, reflecting mean squared error-optimal bandwidth (in kilometres), also noted in the table.  rdrobust calculates these bias-
corrected bandwidths using companion command, “rdbwselect”.  Both parameter of interest and bandwidth are bias corrected, 
variance being estimated using three nearest neighbours.  Locally-weighted averages computed using triangular kernel.  Standard 
errors in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 5. Control RDD regressions: Population, linear polynomial 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Population Anhui-Henan Anhui-Hubei Anhui-Jiangsu Anhui-Jiangxi Anhui-Shandong 
High quality 0.120 0.087 -0.228 0.033 1.002* 
 (0.115) (0.164) (0.163) (0.283) (0.562) 
Bandwidth 31.424 31.212 20.650 16.066 22.077 
Effective 
observations 
959 276 757 233 20 
Observations 2,307 870 2,712 1,041 112 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Population  Anhui-Zhejiang Hubei-Chongqing Hunan-Chongqing Inner Mongolia-
Gansu 
Ningxia-Gansu 
High quality 0.207 -0.089 0.066 0.600 -0.028 
 (0.252) (0.098) (0.387) (0.367) (0.119) 
Bandwidth 18.749 26.538 19.511 19.258 29.339 
Effective 
observations 
331 579 70 1247 1000 
Observations 1,087 1,968 360 5,849 2,644 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Population Sichuan-Gansu Xinjiang-Gansu Fujian-Guangdong Guangxi-
Guangdong 
Hunan-Guangdong 
High quality -0.031 -0.455 -0.044 -0.023 0.178 
 (0.196) (0.288) (0.230) (0.171) (0.215) 
Bandwidth 26.062 33.693 25.996 20.691 18.967 
Effective 
observations 
823 933 255 471 263 
Observations 2,511 2,518 840 1,853 1,096 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Population Jiangxi-Guangdong Hubei-Hunan Jiangxi-Hunan Liaoning-Jilin Inner Mongolia-
Liaoning 
High quality 0.128 0.150 0.123 0.165 -0.050 
 (0.145) (0.132) (0.207) (0.190) (0.123) 
Bandwidth 21.945 33.779 21.455 21.529 17.606 
Effective 
observations 
415 924 477 481 564 
Observations 1,386 2,545 1,829 1,895 2,680 
 (1) (2) 
DV: Population Hubei-Shaanxi Shaanxi-Shanxi 
High quality 0.401* -0.309 
 (0.219) (0.206) 
Bandwidth 14.462 23.077 
Effective 
observations 
258 643 
Observations 1,377 2,474 
Notes: Estimates derived from local linear regressions.  Calculated via Stata’s “rdrobust” command that fits a linear polynomial model on either side 
of cutoff.  Observations refers to number of cells in buffer on either side of border, and effective observations those used in regression, reflecting 
mean squared error-optimal bandwidth (in kilometres), also noted in the table.  rdrobust calculates these bias-corrected bandwidths using companion 
command, “rdbwselect”.  Both parameter of interest and bandwidth are bias corrected, variance being estimated using three nearest neighbours.  
Locally-weighted averages computed using triangular kernel.  Standard errors in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 6. RDD estimates with dialect group fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent 
variable 
Luminosity 
(linear) 
Luminosity 
(quadratic) 
Luminosity per 
person (linear) 
Luminosity per 
person (quadratic) 
Lit 
(linear) 
Lit 
(quadratic) 
       
High quality 
institutions 
-0.0168 -0.0527 -0.0292 -0.0538 -0.00809 -0.0251 
 (0.241) (0.274) (0.0537) (0.0555) (0.0287) (0.0299) 
       
Observations 107,781 107,781 98,831 98,831 107,781 107,781 
Effective 
obs., left of 
cutoff 
9454 15429 7560 15434 9824 17269 
Effective 
obs., right of 
cutoff 
8724 14262 7015 14278 9091 16001 
Bandwidth 5.369 10.53 5.953 12.99 5.678 12.19 
Bandwidth 
bias 
11.94 15.93 14.36 21.94 13.09 18.06 
Kernel Triangular Triangular Triangular Triangular Triangular Triangular 
Notes: Estimates derived from local linear regressions.  Calculated via Stata’s “rdrobust” command that fits a linear polynomial model on either side 
of cutoff.  Observations refers to number of cells in buffer on either side of border, and effective observations those used in regression, reflecting 
mean squared error-optimal bandwidth (in kilometres), also noted in the table.  rdrobust calculates these bias-corrected bandwidths using companion 
command, “rdbwselect”.  Both parameter of interest and bandwidth are bias corrected, variance being estimated using three nearest neighbours.  
Locally-weighted averages computed using triangular kernel.  Standard errors in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 7. RDD estimates with dialect group fixed effects and control variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent 
variable 
Luminosity 
(linear) 
Luminosity 
(quadratic) 
Luminosity 
per person 
(linear) 
Luminosity per 
person (quadratic) 
Lit (linear) Lit 
(quadratic) 
       
High quality 
institutions 
-0.0188 -0.399* -0.0322 -0.0741* -0.00245 -0.0452 
 (0.296) (0.233) (0.0485) (0.0400) (0.0364) (0.0276) 
       
Observations 96,551 96,551 96,551 96,551 96,551 96,551 
Effective obs., 
left of cutoff 
6704 15860 7411 17876 6461 15353 
Effective obs., 
right of cutoff 
6474 15306 7205 17306 6238 14823 
Bandwidth 5.531 14.11 6.121 16.13 5.314 13.62 
Bandwidth bias 15.61 25.73 16.52 28.94 15.43 24.92 
kernel Triangular Triangular Triangular Triangular Triangular Triangular 
Notes: Estimates derived from local linear regressions.  Calculated via Stata’s “rdrobust” command that fits a linear polynomial model on either side 
of cutoff.  Observations refers to number of cells in buffer on either side of border, and effective observations those used in regression, reflecting 
mean squared error-optimal bandwidth (in kilometres), also noted in the table.  rdrobust calculates these bias-corrected bandwidths using companion 
command, “rdbwselect”.  Both parameter of interest and bandwidth are bias corrected, variance being estimated using three nearest neighbours.  
Locally-weighted averages computed using triangular kernel.  Standard errors in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 8. Regression discontinuity estimates, local linear regressions.  Dependent variable: luminosity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Luminosity Anhui-Henan Anhui-Hubei Anhui-Jiangsu Anhui-Jiangxi Anhui-Shandong 
High quality 1.153 -2.285 0.024 0.033 Insufficient obs. 
 (1.030) (1.504) (0.652) (1.082)  
Bandwidth 16.664 16.175 15.552 22.159  
Effective 
observations 
500 186 569 328  
Observations 2,306 868 2,711 1,040  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Luminosity Anhui-Zhejiang Hubei-Chongqing Hunan-Chongqing Inner Mongolia-
Gansu 
Ningxia-Gansu 
High quality -3.025** 0.613 -2.074 -0.188 0.646 
 (1.369) (0.533) (2.422) (0.186) (0.742) 
Bandwidth 20.569 26.060 16.553 17.562 19.926 
Effective 
observations 
219 581 62 1235 674 
Observations 1,086 1,966 360 5,847 2,643 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Luminosity Sichuan-Gansu Xinjiang-Gansu Fujian-Guangdong Guangxi-Guangdong Hunan-Guangdong 
High quality -0.063 -0.048 -1.046 -0.580 -0.308 
 (0.471) (0.370) (1.080) (0.914) (0.997) 
Bandwidth 20.073 22.745 31.756 23.448 24.598 
Effective 
observations 
601 667 312 539 329 
Observations 2,509 2,516 839 1,852 1,095 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Luminosity Jiangxi-Guangdong Hubei-Hunan Jiangxi-Hunan Liaoning-Jilin Inner Mongolia-
Liaoning 
High quality -1.077 -2.23* -0.806 0.169 0.390 
 (0.989) (1.286) (0.912) (0.852) (0.995) 
Bandwidth 20.813 16.817 22.333 25.743 19.737 
Effective 
observations 
368 484 499 602 614 
Observations 1,386 2,542 1,828 1,894 2,680 
 (1) (2) 
DV: Luminosity Hubei-Shaanxi Shaanxi-Shanxi 
High quality -0.990 0.547 
 (0.874) (1.062) 
Bandwidth 18.923 20.856 
Effective 
observations 
339 537 
Observations 1,376 2,471 
Notes: Estimates derived from local linear regressions.  Calculated via Stata’s “rdrobust” command that fits a linear model on either 
side of cutoff.  Estimates and bandwidths are adjusted for covariates noted in main text.  Observations refers to number of cells in 
buffer on either side of border, and effective observations those used in regression, reflecting mean squared error-optimal bandwidth 
(in kilometres), also noted in the table.  rdrobust calculates these bias-corrected bandwidths using companion command, “rdbwselect”.  
Both parameter of interest and bandwidth are bias corrected, variance being estimated using three nearest neighbours.  Locally-
weighted averages computed using triangular kernel.  Standard errors in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 9. Regression discontinuity estimates, local linear regressions (quadratic polynomial).  Dependent 
variable: luminosity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Luminosity Anhui-Henan Anhui-Hubei Anhui-Jiangsu Anhui-Jiangxi Anhui-Shandong 
High quality 1.534 -2.567 0.061 0.713 -2.822* 
 (1.045) (2.034) (0.768) (1.835) (1.659) 
Bandwidth 27.456 21.593 23.170 25.855 18.292 
Effective 
observations 
920 257 949 401 19 
Observations 2306 868 2711 1040 112 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Luminosity Anhui-Zhejiang Hubei-Chongqing Hunan-Chongqing Inner Mongolia-
Gansu 
Ningxia-Gansu 
High quality -3.805* -0.409 -4.166 -0.208 0.044 
 (2.025) (0.823) (3.922) (0.252) (1.210) 
Bandwidth 23.189 31.004 21.879 20.644 22.951 
Effective 
observations 
317 744 84 1508 874 
Observations 1,086 1,966 360 5,847 2,643 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Luminosity Sichuan-Gansu Xinjiang-Gansu Fujian-Guangdong Guangxi-Guangdong Hunan-Guangdong 
High quality -0.264 -0.044 -0.839 -0.630 -0.419 
 (0.497) (0.462) (1.662) (1.277) (1.641) 
Bandwidth 35.714 32.074 34.848 30.238 25.932 
Effective 
observations 
1049 984 372 720 394 
Observations 2,509 2,516 839 1,852 1,095 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Luminosity Jiangxi-Guangdong Hubei-Hunan Jiangxi-Hunan Liaoning-Jilin Inner Mongolia-
Liaoning 
High quality -1.702 -2.504 -1.389 2.976 0.283 
 (1.908) (1.777) (1.685) (1.231) (1.319) 
Bandwidth 22.276 22.318 24.540 21.565 25.852 
Effective 
observations 
444 735 602 516 947 
Observations 1,386 2,542 1,828 1,894 2,680 
 (1) (2) 
DV: Luminosity Hubei-Shaanxi Shaanxi-Shanxi 
High quality -1.211 0.956 
 (1.239) (1.476) 
Bandwidth 24.544 26.078 
Effective 
observations 
493 785 
Observations 1,376 2,471 
Notes: Estimates derived from local linear regressions.  Calculated via Stata’s “rdrobust” command using quadratic polynomial that 
varies on either side of cutoff.  Estimates and bandwidths are adjusted for covariates noted in main text.  Observations refers to 
number of cells in buffer on either side of border, and effective observations those used in regression, reflecting mean squared error-
optimal bandwidth (in kilometres), also noted in the table.  rdrobust calculates these bias-corrected bandwidths using companion 
command, “rdbwselect”.  Both parameter of interest and bandwidth are bias corrected, variance being estimated using three nearest 
neighbours.  Locally-weighted averages computed using triangular kernel.  Standard errors in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 10. Regression discontinuity estimates, local linear regressions.  Dependent variable: lit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Luminosity Anhui-Henan Anhui-Hubei Anhui-Jiangsu Anhui-Jiangxi Anhui-Shandong 
High quality 0.099 -0.333* 0.028 0.060 - 
 (0.100) (0.192) (0.069) (0.131) Multicollinearity in 
covs 
Bandwidth 17.887 15.624 15.807 21.328  
Effective 
observations 
548 169 597 312  
Observations 2306 868 2711 1040  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Luminosity Anhui-Zhejiang Hubei-Chongqing Hunan-Chongqing Inner Mongolia-
Gansu 
Ningxia-Gansu 
High quality -0.228 0.102 -0.388 -0.031 0.054 
 (0.147) (0.065) (0.287) (0.026) (0.903) 
Bandwidth 23.497 27.173 16.352 16.459 20.850 
Effective 
observations 
241 583 62 1191 709 
Observations 1,086 1,966 360 5,847 2,643 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Luminosity Sichuan-Gansu Xinjiang-Gansu Fujian-Guangdong Guangxi-Guangdong Hunan-Guangdong 
High quality -0.025 -0.020 -0.059 -0.063 -0.041 
 (0.055) (0.468) (0.129) (0.103) (0.111) 
Bandwidth 21.825 22.532 30.954 25.955 27.363 
Effective 
observations 
640 630 305  587 343 
Observations 2,509 2,516 839 1,852 1,095 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Luminosity Jiangxi-Guangdong Hubei-Hunan Jiangxi-Hunan Liaoning-Jilin Inner Mongolia-
Liaoning 
High quality -0.150 -0.311 -0.098 0.359 0.055 
 (0.120) (0.158) (0.112) (0.105) (0.107) 
Bandwidth 20.714 16.886 21.643 24.582 21.140 
Effective 
observations 
360 461 491 583 674 
Observations 1,386 2,542 1,828 1,894 2,680 
 (1) (2) 
DV: Luminosity Hubei-Shaanxi Shaanxi-Shanxi 
High quality -0.138 0.097 
 (0.113) (0.114) 
Bandwidth 18.898 22.977 
Effective 
observations 
339 590 
Observations 1,376 2,471 
Notes: Estimates derived from local linear regressions.  Calculated via Stata’s “rdrobust” command using linear polynomial that varies 
on either side of cutoff.  Estimates and bandwidths are adjusted for covariates noted in main text.  Observations refers to number of 
cells in buffer on either side of border, and effective observations those used in regression, reflecting mean squared error-optimal 
bandwidth (in kilometres), also noted in the table.  rdrobust calculates these bias-corrected bandwidths using companion command, 
“rdbwselect”.  Both parameter of interest and bandwidth are bias corrected, variance being estimated using three nearest neighbours.  
Locally-weighted averages computed using triangular kernel.  Standard errors in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 11. Regression discontinuity estimates, local linear regressions (quadratic polynomial).  Dependent 
variable: lit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Luminosity Anhui-Henan Anhui-Hubei Anhui-Jiangsu Anhui-Jiangxi Anhui-Shandong 
High quality 0.124 -0.411 0.036 0.162 - 
 (0.102) (0.257) (0.079) (0.227) Multicollinearity in 
covs 
Bandwidth 29.724 20.726 23.822 24.720  
Effective 
observations 
991 247 1006 386  
Observations 2306 868 2711 1040  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Luminosity Anhui-Zhejiang Hubei-Chongqing Hunan-Chongqing Inner Mongolia-
Gansu 
Ningxia-Gansu 
High quality -0.476 0.002 -0.681 -0.032 0.084 
 (0.259) (0.098) (0.451) (0.034) (0.101) 
Bandwidth 22.789 31.682 21.321 20.837 32.876 
Effective 
observations 
311 785 84 1560 1198 
Observations 1,086 1,966 360 5,847 2,643 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Luminosity Sichuan-Gansu Xinjiang-Gansu Fujian-Guangdong Guangxi-Guangdong Hunan-Guangdong 
High quality -0.032 -0.031 0.010 -0.073 -0.044 
 (0.066) (0.054) (0.206) (0.146) (0.162) 
Bandwidth 33.064 33.908 32.777 31.813 30.940 
Effective 
observations 
1006 1047 363  767 466 
Observations 2,509 2,516 839 1,852 1,095 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Luminosity Jiangxi-Guangdong Hubei-Hunan Jiangxi-Hunan Liaoning-Jilin Inner Mongolia-
Liaoning 
High quality -0.225 -0.424 -0.180 -0.328 0.059 
 (0.231) (0.221) (0.205) (0.261) (0.151) 
Bandwidth 22.076 21.938 23.773 22.089 26.221 
Effective 
observations 
441 696 587 530 957 
Observations 1,386 2,542 1,828 1,894 2,680 
 (1) (2) 
DV: Luminosity Hubei-Shaanxi Shaanxi-Shanxi 
High quality -0.172 0.186 
 (0.150) (0.189) 
Bandwidth 25.558 25.089 
Effective 
observations 
526 726 
Observations 1,376 2,471 
Notes: Estimates derived from local linear regressions.  Calculated via Stata’s “rdrobust” command using quadratic polynomial that 
varies on either side of cutoff.  Estimates and bandwidths are adjusted for covariates noted in main text.  Observations refers to 
number of cells in buffer on either side of border, and effective observations those used in regression, reflecting mean squared error-
optimal bandwidth (in kilometres), also noted in the table.  rdrobust calculates these bias-corrected bandwidths using companion 
command, “rdbwselect”.  Both parameter of interest and bandwidth are bias corrected, variance being estimated using three nearest 
neighbours.  Locally-weighted averages computed using triangular kernel.  Standard errors in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 12. Data sources 
 
   
Variable Operationalization Source 
   
Luminosity Log of sum of digital numbers 
within cell 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association: National 
Centers for Environmental Information.  
http://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/dmsp.html.   
Lit Dummy =1 if Luminosity >0 As above. 
Population Log of total population within cell, 
2005 
Gridded Population of the World, Version 4 (CIESIN, 
2016). 
Elevation Metres above sea level, 
cell/province mean 
China Historical Geographic Information System 
(CHGIS), Fairbank Center (2016). 
Ruggedness Standard deviation in Elevation, 
cell/province mean 
China Historical Geographic Information System 
(CHGIS), Fairbank Center (2016). 
Road density Average distance to nearest road 
among pixels within cell 
Global Roads Open Access Dataset, Version 1 (CIESIN, 
2013). 
   
Precipitation Sum of annual precipitation within 
cell/province, averaged of years 
1970-2000. 
WorldClim – Global Climate Data (Fick and Hijmans, 
2017). 
   
Distance to 
road 
Geodesic distance from cell 
centroid to nearest road. 
Global Roads Open Access Dataset, Version 1 (CIESIN, 
2013). 
Percent 
private 
Percentage of employees in 
prefecture employed in urban 
private enterprises or self-
employed.   
China City Statistical Yearbooks.  Accessed via China 
Data Center, University of Michigan. 
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
